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ABSTRACT
Graph embeddings have been proposed to map graph data to low
dimensional space for downstream processing (e.g., node classifica-
tion or link prediction). With the increasing collection of personal
data, graph embeddings can be trained on private and sensitive
data. For the first time, we quantify the privacy leakage in graph
embeddings through three inference attacks targeting Graph Neu-
ral Networks. We propose a membership inference attack to infer
whether a graph node corresponding to individual user’s data was
member of the model’s training or not. We consider a blackbox
setting where the adversary exploits the output prediction scores,
and a whitebox setting where the adversary has also access to the
released node embeddings. This attack provides an accuracy up to
28% (blackbox) 36% (whitebox) beyond random guess by exploiting
the distinguishable footprint between train and test data records
left by the graph embedding. We propose a Graph Reconstruction
attack where the adversary aims to reconstruct the target graph
given the corresponding graph embeddings. Here, the adversary
can reconstruct the graph with more than 80% of accuracy and
link inference between two nodes around 30% more confidence
than a random guess. We then propose an attribute inference attack
where the adversary aims to infer a sensitive attribute. We show
that graph embeddings are strongly correlated to node attributes
letting the adversary inferring sensitive information (e.g., gender
or location).
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Large scale real-world systems are typically modelled in the form of
graphs: online social networks, world wide web, citation networks
and biomedical datasets, which represent the entities as nodes and
their relationship with edges [41]. Traditional Deep Neural Net-
works fail to capture the nuances of structured data but a specific
class of algorithms, namely, Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have
shown state of the art performance on such complex graph data for
node classification, link prediction etc. An important pre-processing
step for using graph data with machine learning is embedding the
high dimensional graph data to a low dimensional representation
for easy processing by machine learning algorithms. In many ap-
plications, such embeddings are released for further processing
to save storage cost without considering the privacy implications.
Such large graph dataset raises the question of privacy specifically
if the algorithms are trained with private and potentially sensitive
data. Consider a graph capturing the outbreak of a disease where
the nodes represent the individuals, medical symptoms as the node
features and the edges indicating the disease transmission. Typi-
cally, in such datasets a GNN provides state of the art performance
for predicting disease for an arbitrary user in the graph (node classi-
fication) and determining the future outbreak (link prediction). For
such embedding models which do not account privacy, an adver-
sary can however infer the health status of a particular user (node
in graph) by identifying whether the user was part of the train-
ing data or not. Further, the adversary can potentially reconstruct
the sensitive graph input from the low dimensional embeddings.
Finally, graph embeddings capture important semantics from the
input graph while maintaining the contextual information in the
form of preferential connection which can be exploited to infer
sensitive attributes about an individual. These three privacy at-
tacks, namely, membership inference, graph reconstruction and
attribute inference, are examples of a direct privacy violation of
the individual which can further be used without user consent. Fur-
ther, companies spend enormous resources to annotate the training
dataset to achieve state of the art performance and such attacks
inferring training data also violates the Intellectual Property.
In the context of Machine Learning (ML), a privacy violation oc-
curs when an adversary infers something about a particular user’s
data record in the training dataset which cannot be inferred from
other models trained on similar data distribution [27, 31]. This infor-
mation leakage is quantified using the success of inference attacks.
In attribute inference attacks, the attacker infers sensitive features
of an individual’s data record used in model’s training. A stronger
case of attribute inference is where the attacker reconstructs a por-
tion of the sensitive training data itself, i.e, data reconstruction
attack. In case of membership inference, the adversary traces a
particular individual’s record to the training dataset, i.e., identify
whether a given data recordwas amember of the training data. Prior
literature in privacy attacks focus on models trained on non-graph
data including text, images and speech to study the vulnerability
to membership inference [30, 31], attribute inference [2, 12], prop-
erty inference [11], model inversion [10] attacks as well as model
parameter and hyperparameter stealing attacks [8, 9, 38]. While
well studied in traditional ML, the privacy risk in graph-based ML
models under adversarial setting has not been fully explored and
quantified.
In this work, we propose the first comprehensive privacy analy-
sis of Graph Embedding algorithms under different threat models
and adversary assumptions. We mainly focus on exploiting pub-
licly released graph embeddings trained with private data, used for
different downstream tasks, under various attacks which violates
the user’s data privacy: membership inference, graph reconstruc-
tion and attribute inference. First, we evaluate the privacy leakage
under membership inference attacks though a blackbox and white-
box settings. The blackbox setting considers the specific case of
downstream node classification task for convolution kernel based
graph embedding with neural network. In this setting, we propose
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two attacks for membership inference: with auxilary knowledge on
the data distribution (shadow model attack) and without auxilary
knowledge (confidence score attack). Here, we show that the pro-
posed attacks have an inference accuracy of 78%, 63%, and 60% for
confidence score attack and 62%, 60%, and 55% for shadow model
attack, respectively for three different datasets, i.e., Cora, Citesser
and Pubmed dataset. For the whitebox setting, we propose an un-
supervised attack for the more generic case of using just the graph
embeddings to differentiate whether a given node was part of the
training graph or not. We show that an adversary in this setting
can predict the training data with a high accuracy (70% on average
on the three datasets).
Second, we propose a novel graph reconstruction attack where
the adversary, given access to the node embeddings of a subgraph,
trains an encoder-decoder model to reconstruct the target graph
from its publicly released embeddings. This attack has serious pri-
vacy implications since the adversary reconstructs the input graph
dataset which can be potentially sensitive. The proposed attack
has high precision: 0.722 for Cora, 0.778 for Citeseer and 0.95 for
Pubmed dataset. Moreover, on increasing the adversary’s prior
knowledge, the attack performance increases significantly. An im-
portant privacy implication is link inference, i.e, predicting whether
there exists a link between any two nodes in the graph. Through
this attack, an adversary infers a link between nodes with 93%, 90%
and 57% of accuracy for respectively Cora, Citeseer and Pubmed
dataset, compared to the 50% baseline random guess accuracy.
Finally, we propose the attribute inference attack where the ad-
versary tries to infer sensitive attributes for user node in the graph
using the released graph embeddings. We consider two state of the
art unsupervised random walk based embeddings, Node2Vec and
DeepWalk, on two real-world social networking datasets: Facebook
and LastFM, where the adversary aims to infer the user gender and
location, respectively. Given access to the embeddings of a sub-
graph and corresponding sensitive attributes, we model attribute
inference as a supervised learning problem. The adversary trains a
supervised attack model to predict sensitive hidden attributes for
target users given the released publicly available target embeddings.
Here, the attack model’s F1 score (capturing the balance between
precision and recall) on LastFM was as high as 0.65 for DeepWalk
and 0.83 for Node2Vec. For Facebook, the F1 score was 0.61 for
Node2Vec and 0.59 for DeepWalk. The paper indicates the serious
data privacy risks in graph data processing algorithms and calls
for further research to design privacy-preserving embedding algo-
rithms for graph data. The code for all the experiments is made
publicly available for easy reproducibility1.
The paper is organized as follows. Backgrounds on graph em-
bedding algorithms and GNNs are introduced Section 2, followed
by the considered threat models Section 3. Experimental setup is
described Section 4. Evaluations of the proposed attacks are then
given Section 5 before related work Section 6 Finally, concluding
remarks are given Section 7.
2 BACKGROUND
A large number of real-world applications require processing graph
data which contains rich relational information between different
1Anonymized for Submission
entities (e.g., online social media, disease outbreaks, recommen-
dation engines, knowledge graphs and navigation systems) [41].
Deep Learning and more precisely Convolutional Neural Networks
have shown tremendous performance over non-graph data such as
images by capturing the spatial relation between pixels of image
and extracting features over multiple layers. However, this machine
learning scheme has shown its limits for graph data and the learning
on such data is still challenging [41]. Indeed, the models have to cap-
ture the connections in the data while ensuring invariance of graph
data representation, even without fixed ordering between the nodes
(i.e., the adjacency matrix representing the connections between
nodes varies but still results in the same graph). To overcome this
limitation, the graph data is passed through embedding algorithms
which map the large graphs to lower dimensions which are then
used for downstream processing with GNNs. Graph embedding
algorithms enable models operating on low dimensional euclidean
datasets (i.e., such as images) to graph data by mapping them into
a low dimensional embedding. We represent a graph as 𝐺 = (𝑉 , 𝐸)
where 𝑉 represents the vertex set consisting of nodes {𝑣1, ..., 𝑣𝑛}
where the connections between the edges 𝐸 is represented as a
symmetric, sparse adjacency matrix 𝐴 ∈ 𝑅𝑛𝑥𝑛 where 𝑎𝑖 𝑗 denotes
the edge weight between nodes with 𝑎𝑖 𝑗 = 0 for missing edges.
2.1 Graph Embedding Algorithms
In order to mitigate the space and computation overhead of down-
stream graph processing, graph embedding algorithms provide an
efficient approach to represent the graph data in a low dimension
embedding [6]. Specifically, an embedding algorithm Ψ : 𝑉 → R𝑑
where nodes𝑉 ∈𝐺 . The embedding Ψ(𝑣) of a single node 𝑣 is hence
an 𝑑-dimensional vector capturing the properties of the original
graph such as distance from other nodes. Different graph embed-
ding algorithms to embed both the entire graphs as well as the
nodes have been well studied [4]. Random walk based node embed-
ding algorithms traverse the graph to sample random walks which
are then passed as sentences to SkipGram algorithm to obtain the
corresponding node features [14, 29]. In deep learning based graph
embeddings, both the features along with adjacency matrix can be
used to generate low dimensional embeddings for each of the nodes.
For generating these embeddings, the parameters of the embedding
function are updated to improve the representation of the graph
nodes while maintaining the original properties. These are typically
modelled using GNNs and Graph Convolutional Networks. In this
work, we mainly focus on node embeddings which we refer as
graph embeddings throughout the paper. We consider random walk
based embeddings for attribute inference and deep learning based
embeddings for node inference and graph reconstruction attacks.
2.2 Graph Neural Networks
The initial layers of a GNN are used to generate embedding for the
input graphs which can be extended for node classification and
link prediction tasks by attacking a classifier network as GNNs.
The pre-processed graph in the form of embeddings along with
the node features are represented as matrices for computation. The
training of GNNs relies on a message passing algorithm which is
the weighted aggregation of features of neighbouring nodes N(𝑣)
to compute the feature of a particular node 𝑣 . Given the features 𝑥
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of a single node 𝑣 , the GNN produces an output label 𝑓 (𝑥 ;𝑊 ) which
captures the probability of the input node with features 𝑥 belonging
to a particular class. The loss over the resultant classification for
the node 𝑣 is then backpropagated to update the model weights
for aggregation. Consider a 𝑁 × 𝐷𝐹 feature matrix 𝑋 where 𝑁 is
the number of nodes, 𝐷𝐹 is the number of node features and an
adjacency matrix 𝐴 which captures the representation of graph
structure in matrix form. The output of a layer with 𝐹 features
takes the feature matrix along with the adjacency matrix as input
to produce a 𝑁 × 𝐹 matrix as an output. The computation is given
by 𝐻 (𝑙+1) = 𝑓𝑎𝑔𝑔 (𝐻 (𝑙) , 𝐴) with 𝐻 (0) = 𝑋 and 𝐻 (𝐿) = 𝑍 , 𝐿 being
the number of layers and 𝐻 is the intermediate activation. Based
on the different aggregation function 𝑓𝑎𝑔𝑔 (), we obtain different
GNN algorithms such as Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) [21],
GraphSAGE [15], Graph Attention Networks (GAT) [37] and Topol-
ogy Adaptive GCN (TAGCN) [7].
3 THREAT MODELS
In this section, we describe the considered threat models as well as
the methodology and adversary assumptions.
3.1 Membership Inference Attacks
Membership Inference attacks allow personal information leak-
age in GNNs. Specifically, the goal of the adversary is to identify
whether a user node 𝑣 is part of the graph 𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 used for train-
ing the target model. This is a binary classification problem where
the adversary learns the threshold to predict the membership of
a user node. Depending on the adversary’s knowledge about 𝑓 (),
we consider two settings: blackbox (with and without auxiliary
knowledge) and whitebox. As shown Figure 1, to distinguish be-
tween members and non-members of training graph 𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 , the
blackbox attacks exploit the statistical difference in output pre-
dictions while the whitebox attack exploits the intermediate low
dimensional embedding.
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Figure 1: Blackbox and whitebox inference attacks to distin-
guish members and non-members of 𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 .
3.1.1 Blackbox: Inference using Output Predictions. In this setting,
we consider the target model as trained GNN for node classification
task. The adversary aims to infer whether a user’s node in the
graph was used in training the target model 𝑓 (). In a blackbox
setting, adversary has only access to the model outputs 𝑓 (𝑥 ;𝑊 )
for a given input 𝑥 . The parameters of the trained model𝑊 as well
as the intermediate computation are inaccessible to the adversary.
This is a practical setting, typically seen in the case of Machine
Learning as a Service, where a trained model is deployed in the
cloud and the adversary queries the model through an API and
receives corresponding predictions.
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Figure 2: Model predictions are more confident for nodes in
𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 compared to test graph (left). The extent of overfitting
can be detected by a non-overlapping region between the
output prediction distributions across all data points (right).
Blackbox adversary exploits the statistical difference between the
confidence in prediction on training and testing data [31]. Figure 2
(left) illustrates this difference where the prediction confidence for
one class is much higher for training data points. Predicting with
higher confidence on seen𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 nodes compared to unseen test
nodes is referred as overfitting. This difference in the output predic-
tion confidence directly results from a distinguishable output dis-
tribution between train and test data indicated by non-overlapping
region between distributions (Figure 2, right).
We consider two attacks within the blackbox setting: (a) shadow
model attack and (b) confidence score attack.
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Shadow Attack: The shadow attack relies on the adversary train-
ing a local substitute model with similar functionality as the target
model to identify characteristics of members and non-members.
The adversary has knowledge about the target GNN architecture
and auxiliary graph dataset 𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑥 sampled from the same underly-
ing data distribution as𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 which is consistent with prior attack
settings [2, 12, 16, 31] but the attack is transferable across different
models [30]. This is a practical assumption where social networks
have publicly available API enabling the adversary to obtain sub-
graphs of the original social network graph. To conduct its attack,
the adversary uses prior knowledge to map the target model’s pre-
dictions to membership values and hence the attack is supervised.
For a target model 𝑓 (), the adversary trains a substitute model
𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 on auxiliary graph data (𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑥 ) drawn from the same distri-
bution as 𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 . The datasets are assumed to be non-overlapping,
i.e,𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∩𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑥 = 𝜙 , which makes the attack more practical. The
goal is to train 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 to mimic the behaviour of 𝑓 (), i.e, the output
predictions should be similar to each other 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 (𝑣 ;𝑊 ′) ∼ 𝑓 (𝑣 ;𝑊 )
for the same input user node 𝑣 but different parameters𝑊 ′ and𝑊
due to training on the different data. Given the substitute model, the
adversary creates a synthetic dataset with binary classes for distin-
guishing members and non-members (encoded as class 1 and class
0) of 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ’s training data 𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑥 while using the output predictions
as the input features. That is, the synthetic dataset has the input
as 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ’s predictions for an user node 𝑣 classified as "Member"
if 𝑣 ∈ 𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑥 and "Non-Member" otherwise. Hence, 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 is used
as a proxy for 𝑓 () to learn the mapping between the 𝑓 ()’s output
predictions and the membership information. The adversary trains
a binary attack classifier 𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 on the synthetic dataset used to
predict whether a new user node was member of 𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 .
Confidence Attack: In this particular case, we alleviate the as-
sumption of adversary knowledge about data distribution and tar-
get model architecture as part of shadow model making the attack
applicable to a wide range of practical scenarios. Since, the adver-
sary does not have prior knowledge to map the output predictions
of target model to classify the membership, the attack is performed
in an unsupervised setting. To conduct its attack, the adversary
leverages the fact that graph nodes with higher output confidence
prediction are likely to be members of 𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 . Here, the adversary
finds the output prediction with highest confidence and compares
whether this is above a certain threshold to decide whether the
corresponding graph node was in the model’s training graph𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛
or not. A large output confidence indicates membership of the data
point in the training data. The adversary sweeps across different
values to select the threshold value which best suits the application.
Prior work in traditional ML has indicated that the confidence at-
tack is much better compared to shadow model attack as the which
is verified in our experiments [35]. The signal used to distinguish
members from non-members from confidence score attacks is di-
rectly from the target model which the shadow model is subtle and
uses a substitute model’s output as a signal. The attack success in
this case is reliant on the quality of auxiliary data for training local
substitute model and its functional similarity with the target model.
3.1.2 Whitebox: Inference using Graph Embedding. The adversary
in a whitebox setting has access to the model output predictions
𝑓 (𝑥 ;𝑊 ) for an input 𝑥 as well as the model parameters𝑊 . This
allows the adversary to compute the intermediate computations
after each layer which in our case corresponds to the embedding
for each node as an output of graph convolutional layer. This is a
strong adversary assumption but practical in the case of federated
learning where the intermediate computations and parameters can
be observed [24, 27].
As explained Section 2, GNNs compute the low dimensional
embedding for the input graph data. The parameters of GNNs are
updated in each iteration of training and are tuned specifically for
high performance on the train data resulting in a distinguishable
footprint between embedding of train and test data points. Figure 3
illustrates this rationale by plotting embedding of train and test
graph nodes for the three datasets after a dimension reduction using
2D-TSNE algorithm [36].
The attack is unsupervised as the adversary has no prior knowl-
edge to map the intermediate embeddings to a membership value.
The adversary trains an encoder-decoder network in unsupervised
fashion to map the intermediate embedding to a single membership
value. For an input graph node’s embedding Ψ(𝑣), encoder 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑐 ()
generates a scalar membership value which is passed to decoder
𝑓𝑑𝑒𝑐 (𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑐 (Ψ(𝑣))) to obtain Ψ(𝑣) by minimizing reconstruction loss:
| |Ψ(𝑣) − 𝑓𝑑𝑒𝑐 (𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑐 (Ψ(𝑣))) | |22. Given the membership values for dif-
ferent training and testing data points, K-Means clustering is used
to cluster nodes into two classes (members and non-members). For
any new user node, the adversary then clusters as members or
non-members of the training data.
3.2 Graph Reconstruction Attack
Given a sensitive target graph data (𝐺𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ) and the corresponding
set of publicly released embeddings, Ψ(𝑣) ∀𝑣 ∈ 𝐺𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 , the goal
of the adversary in this attack is to reconstruct 𝐺𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 and the
corresponding connections between the different nodes 𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 .
Specifically, the goal of the adversary is to reconstruct the adjacency
matrix 𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 of the graph which is binary with 𝐴𝑖 𝑗 = 1 if there
exists an edge between the node 𝑖 and 𝑗 and zero otherwise. While
node membership inference is a subtle privacy violation of user’s
data, this is a stronger attack where the entire sensitive graph data
is reconstructed by the adversary.
Graph embeddings are specially computed to ensure that the
underlying graph properties do not change. In other words, the
embeddings capture the rich semantic, invariant and structural
information about the graph, for instance, by preserving proximity
to the neighbouring nodes. Hence, there exists a strong correlation
between the released graph embeddings and the actual graph which
can be exploited to reconstruct the graph data.
The adversary is assumed to have knowledge of the auxiliary
subgraph 𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑥 which is sampled from the same distribution as the
target graph 𝐺𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 . Empirically, this is obtained by sampling two
non-overlapping subgraphs from the full graph dataset. The adver-
sary performs graph reconstruction in two phases (Figure 4). In
Phase I, the adversary trains a graph encoder-decoder attack model
on 𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑥 . The graph encoder 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑐 maps the adjacency matrix of
𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑥 to corresponding node embeddings Ψ(𝑣) → 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑐 (𝑣) ∀ 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉
represented as adjacency matrix. The decoder 𝑓𝑑𝑒𝑐 reconstructs
the adjacency matrix 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑐 = 𝑓𝑑𝑒𝑐 (Ψ(𝑣)) while both the models
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Figure 3: Whitebox membership inference attacks exploit the distinguishable intermediate embedding of train and test graph
nodes for Citeseer (left), Cora (middle) and Pubmed dataset (right).
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Figure 4: Attack methodology for graph reconstruction
from released embeddings.
are trained using backpropagation to minimize reconstruction loss:
| |𝐴 − 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑐 | |22. For the attack model, we consider an architecture
with graph convolution as encoder and a decoder which computes
the dot product between the embedding vector Ψ(𝑣) and its trans-
pose Ψ𝑇 (𝑣) [21]. The attack models are trained on𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑥 and tested
on the target embeddings corresponding to target graph 𝐺𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
to reconstruct the graph data. Given the target released embed-
dings, the adversary then uses the trained decoder attack model
to map the released embeddings to the target adjacency matrix
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 = 𝑓𝑑𝑒𝑐 (Ψ(𝑣 ′)) ∀ 𝑣 ′ ∈ 𝐺𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 .
Link inference: Link inference is a direct result from the graph
reconstruction attack where the adversary can check for an edge
between two users using the adjacency matrix of the reconstructed
graph. This inference is a binary classification problem where the
adversary aims to infer whether there exists a link between two
nodes in the graph. This inference represents the knowledge that
two people know each other in online social networks for instance
leading to identify the friendship circle of users which is a privacy
violation of individuals. More formally, given two user nodes 𝑖 and
𝑗 , the adversary queries the reconstructed adjacency matrix𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
to infer whether there exists a link between 𝑖 𝑗 (if𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 [𝑖] [ 𝑗] = 1)
or not (if 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 [𝑖] [ 𝑗] = 0). The success of link inference attack
closely depends on the success of reconstructing the target adja-
cency matrix 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∼ 𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 .
3.3 Attribute Inference Attack
While the previous attack focussed on sensitive graph data and
inference attacks exploiting connections between different nodes,
attribute inference attacks exploit user node’s sensitive features.
Particularly, given the embedding of the subgraph nodes and cor-
responding sensitive attribute (Ψ(𝑣), 𝑠𝑣) ∀𝑣 ∈ 𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑥 , the adversary
aims to infer the sensitive attributes 𝑠∗ corresponding to the pub-
licly released target embeddings Ψ(𝑣 ′) ∀𝑣 ′ ∈ 𝐺𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 . This is a
practical assumption as a small fraction of users indeed make their
information publicly available on their profile while other users
prefer to keep such information private such as gender and location.
Nodes in graphs for most practical real world applications fol-
low preferential connections, i.e, nodes similar to each other are
connected to each other. This is particularly true in case of social net-
works where users with similar likes and preferences, represented
as features for nodes in the graph, are connected together [13, 20].
This feature similarity and preferential connections in graphs are
captured by graph embeddings to preserve the graph properties.
Hence, the embeddings are strongly correlated with the node fea-
tures which can be exploited to infer sensitive attributes.
The adversary has access to the node embeddings and corre-
sponding node’s sensitive attributes (Ψ(𝑣), 𝑠𝑣) ∀𝑣 ∈ 𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑥 from the
auxiliary subgraph known to the adversary. The adversary uses this
prior knowledge to train a supervised attack classifier 𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 which
maps the embedding to sensitive attributes, i.e, 𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 : Ψ(𝑣) → 𝑠𝑣 .
Using this trained attack model, the adversary infers the sensitive
attribute 𝑠∗ corresponding to the target embeddings 𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 (Ψ(𝑣 ′))
where 𝑣 ′ ∈ 𝐺𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 .
4 EXPERIMENT SETUP
4.1 Datasets
For the membership inference and graph reconstruction attack, we
consider three standard benchmarking datasets: Pubmed, Citeseer
and Cora. For the attribute inference attack, in turn, we consider two
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social networking datasets with anonymized sensitive attributes:
Facebook2 and LastFM3.
Pubmed. The Pubmed Diabetes dataset consists of 19,717 scientific
publications from PubMed database pertaining to diabetes classified
into one of three classes. The citation network consists of 44,338
links. Each publication in the dataset is described by a TF/IDF
weighted word vector from a dictionary which consists of 500
unique words. We use 60 train samples, 500 validation samples and
1,000 test samples.
Citeseer. The CiteSeer dataset consists of 3,312 scientific publica-
tions classified into one of six classes. The citation network consists
of 4,732 links. Each publication is described by a 0/1-valued word
vector indicating the absence/presence of the corresponding word
from the dictionary. The dictionary consists of 3,703 unique words.
The number of training samples is 120, 500 validation samples and
1,000 test samples.
Cora. The Cora dataset consists of 2,708 scientific publications
classified into one of seven classes. The citation network consists
of 5,429 links. Each publication is described by a 0/1-valued word
vector indicating the absence/presence of the corresponding word
from the dictionary. The dictionary consists of 1,433 unique words.
For training 140 samples are used, 300 validation samples and 1,000
test samples.
Facebook. The dataset comprises of 4,039 nodes representing dif-
ferent user accounts on the social network connected with each
other through 88,234 edges. Each user node has different features
including the gender, education, hometown etc. The user infor-
mation has been anonymized through pseudonymization and the
interpretation of the features have been obscured (i.e, attributes
’Male’ and ’Female’ have been replace with ’Gender 1’ and ’Gender
2’, respectively).
LastFM. The dataset was collected in March 2,020 using the public
API provided by the social network specifically created for users
from Asian countries. The dataset has 7,624 nodes connected to-
gether with 27,806 edges based on mutual follower relationships.
Each user has attributes such as the music and artists they likes,
location etc.
4.2 Embedding Algorithms
For the purpose of our experiments, we consider two classes of
embedding algorithms: GNNs and random walk based. We consider
the following GNN based embedding techniques:
Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) [21]. GCN computes the
target node features from neighbouring nodes using matrix factor-
ization, by normalizing adjacency matrix 𝐴 as 𝐷−1𝐴 where 𝐷 is
the diagonal node degree matrix and results in averaging of neigh-
bouring node features. An additional trick is to use a symmetric
normalization as 𝐷− 12𝐴𝐷− 12 .
GraphSAGE [15]. GraphSAGE extends the operations in GCN
to more generic functions for transformation and aggregating of
node features. While the embedding of graph data in GCN relies
on matrix factorization, GraphSAGE uses node feature aggregation
using mean, LSTM and pooling to learn the embedding function.
2http://snap.stanford.edu/data/ego-Facebook.html
3http://snap.stanford.edu/data/feather-lastfm-social.html
GraphAttentionNetworks (GAT) [37].Weights associatedwith
features during aggregation are explicitly defined and learnt during
training. GAT implicitly defines the weights using self-attention
mechanism over the node features.
TopologyAdaptiveGCN (TAGCN) [7]. Instead of using the spec-
tral convolutions for learning non-linear graph data, TAGCN pro-
poses to use general K-localized filter convolution in the vertex
domain. It replaces the fixed square filters in traditional spectral
GCNs for the grid-structured input data volumes.
For membership inference, we consider the embeddings from all
the above four architectures for the whitebox setting while for
the blackbox setting we consider only GraphSAGE algorithm as
inductive training graphs models is challenging and GraphSAGE
architecture is specifically designed to work in such training set-
tings [15]. In case of graph reconstruction attacks, we consider
the generic GCN model as the encoder for the attack model. In
case of attribute inference attacks, we consider two state of the art
unsupervised graph embedding algorithms based on random walk,
namely, Node2Vec [14] and DeepWalk [29].
DeepWalk [29]. The algorithm creates a transitionmatrix from the
graph and samples random walks from the matrix. The nodes are
viewed as words and the randomwalks are viewed as sentences and
the resulting sequences are passed to Word2Vec and SkipGram [25]
to obtain node embeddings.
Node2Vec [14]. This is an extension of DeepWalk which combines
Breadth First and Depth First search explorations on the graph to
create biased random walks. The embeddings are computed using
Word2Vec algorithm as mentioned above.
4.3 Metrics
To estimate the attack success of both membership and link infer-
ence, we consider the inference accuracy.
Inference Accuracy. Membership and link inference are binary
classification problems: node is part of the training data or not
(membership inference) and there exists a link between any two
nodes or not (Link Inference). Hence, the accuracy of random guess
is 50% and any higher accuracy indicates a privacy leakage about the
model’s sensitive training data. In order to compute the additional
benefit the adversary gets in terms of performing the attack over
random guess, we name ’adversary advantage’ a metric computed
as: 𝐼𝑎𝑑𝑣 = 2 ∗ (𝐼𝑎𝑐𝑐 − 0.5). This metric estimates the information
leakage from the model compared to a random guess.
For evaluating the performance of graph reconstruction attacks,
we use two main metrics: precision and roc score.
Precision. The ratio of true positives is given by the precision and
estimates the percentage of the predicted samples that are actually
in the target graph.
ROC-AUC Score. The ROC curve plots the true positive rate on
the y-axis and the false positive rate on the x-axis. The AUC score
computes the area under the ROC curve to get how good the model
distinguishes between different classes. For a binary classification
problem of graph reconstruction to obtain the binary adjacency
matrix, the random guess accuracy is 50% and any higher accuracy
indicates the adversary’s advantage in reconstructing the target
graph.
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Figure 5: Blackbox membership inference attack uses the
output predictions to give adversary an inference advantage.
In case of attribute inference attack, we evaluate using the F1 score
to balance both the recall and precision.
F1-Score. This metric computes the harmonic mean between the
precision and recall which estimates the percentage of samples in
the target graph which are predicted as such.
4.4 Methodology
In this work, we specifically focus on inductive training of GNN
where the model does not see test nodes during training unlike
transductive learning where the entire graph and features are avail-
able apriori. Given the full graph 𝐺 𝑓 𝑢𝑙𝑙 , we sample a subgraph
𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 which is used for training the models and evaluate the model
performance on the held out graph 𝐺 𝑓 𝑢𝑙𝑙 −𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 . Such an induc-
tive setting enables the adversary to learn new information about
the target model’s training graph resulting in a privacy leakage.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the privacy leakage from attacks.
5.1 Membership Inference Attack from Output
Predictions (Blackbox setting)
The overfitting for GraphSage architecture trained on the three
datasets is given in Figure 5(a). We evaluate the two blackbox in-
ference attacks exploiting the output predictions from the models:
shadow inference which uses auxiliary knowledge on the data dis-
tribution and confidence inference which does not use auxiliary
knowledge. Results depicted Figure 5(b) show that under confidence
inference attacks, the inference accuracy is 78.28% (corresponding
to an adversary’s advantage of 27.48%), 63.75% (an adversary’s ad-
vantage of 56.56%), and 60.89% (an advantage of 21.78%) for Cora,
Citesser, and Pubmed datasets, respectively. In case of shadow
model attacks, the inference accuracy for Cora is 62.06% (repre-
senting an adversary advantage of 21.74%), 60.87% for Citeseer (an
adversary advantage of 24.12%), 55.51% for Pubmed dataset (an ad-
versary advantage of 11.02%). Membership leakage is thus higher in
confidence attack (i.e., without auxiliary knowledge) compared to
shadow model attack (i.e., with auxiliary knowledge). While coun-
terintuitive, this result is consistent with similar attackmethodology
for traditional machine learning models [35].
Impact of Increasing Number of Layers. We evaluate the
performance of confidence attack on increasing the range of neigh-
bourhood nodes used for aggregating the features (Figure 6). To
do that, we extend the range of the message passing algorithm
by increasing the number of layers in the GNNs [22, 23]. On in-
creasing the number of layers from 2 to 6, the inference accuracy
decreases by 8% for GCN. Interestingly, the generalization error
increases (train accuracy remains the same but the test accuracy
decreases) for Cora, Citeseer and Pubmed dataset, but the inference
accuracy continues to decrease which indicates that the influence
of preferential connections between different nodes in the graph
plays a significant role in influencing the inference accuracy. For
large number of layers (> 8 layers) in the GNN, for all datasets and
architectures, the model completely loses its predictive power. In
general, the inference accuracy as well as prediction accuracy de-
creases with increasing the range of the message passing algorithm
by increasing the layers from 2 to 16. This implies that the mem-
bership privacy leakage is influenced by the structured graph data
with preferential connections between different nodes. Specifically,
aggregating features from larger number of nodes results in higher
averaging which reduces the distinguishability (over-smoothening
of features) as model converges to random walk’s limit distribu-
tion [22, 23] which is crucial for inference attacks [30, 31].
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Figure 6: The inference accuracy and predictive power de-
creases on increasing the number of layers due to feature
oversmoothening from nodes deeper in the graph.
5.2 Membership Inference Attack from Graph
Embeddings (Whitebox setting)
We exploit the difference in intermediate feature representation
of train and test data to perform membership inference attack in
a whitebox setting. Results show that different models trained on
PubMed dataset leak significantly more information between 20%
and 36% over random guess accuracy. On the other hand, models
trained on Citeseer dataset provide to the adversary an advantage
between 7% and 17% over random guess while for Cora dataset
it is between 4% and 7%. The embedding is significantly different
for train and test data points for PubMed dataset as seen Figure 7
which result in a higher whitebox membership inference accuracy
compared to Cora and Citeseer dataset. The higher accuracy for
Pubmed dataset can be attributed to significant distinguishability
of features as seen by visually inspecting in Figure 3.
The success of the unsupervised whitebox attack is attributed to
the message passing which updates the parameters (weights) to
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Figure 7: Adversary advantage for node membership infer-
ence from Graph Embeddings.
specifically ensure higher distinguishability between the data points
of different classes for high accuracy on training dataset. Indeed,
the parameters are specifically updated to fit the training dataset
resulting in a high distinguishability between feature embedding
of train and test data records. Moreover, the feature embedding for
the initial layers are useful since for later layers the features are
oversmoothened which also reduces accuracy (as seen in increasing
the range of nodes of message passing algorithm).
5.3 Graph Reconstruction Attack
The success of graph reconstruction is evaluated on the unseen
target graph while the model is trained on the train graph. The
test AUC score for Cora dataset is 0.65 and the average precision
is 0.722 while for Citeseer dataset the AUC score is 0.65 and 0.778
average precision. For Pubmed dataset, we get an average precision
of 0.95 on the test set with an ROC of 0.94 in reconstructing the
target test graph. The curve for variation of AUC score and the
average precision for the three datasets on the validation sub graph
is given in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Training curves for AUC score and Average Preci-
sion on the validation graph.
Impact of Adversary Knowledge. On increasing the adversary’s
knowledge to 50% of the target graph, we observe an increase the
attack performance. Specifically, the AUC score for Cora increases
to 0.76 from 0.65 while the average precision increases to 0.81 from
0.722. In Citeseer dataset, the AUC score increases to 0.779 from 0.65
while the average precision increases to 0.828 from 0.778. Finally,
for Pubmed dataset showed an increase to 0.95 from 0.94 AUC score
and 0.96 from 0.95 average precision.
5.4 Link Inference Attack
A direct implication of graph reconstruction attack is inferring
whether there exists a link between two nodes in the network
by querying the reconstructed adjacency matrix. This is a binary
classification problem.
0 200 400 600 800 1,000
0
20
40
60
80
100
Iterations
L
in
k
In
fe
re
n
ce
A
cc
u
ra
cy
%
Citeseer
Cora
Pubmed
Figure 9: Link Inference Accuracy Curve over different
epochs
For Citeseer dataset, the accuracy of of inference is around 93.39%
while for Cora dataset the inference accuracy is 90.73% and 57.28%
for Pubmed dataset. This indicates an adversary advantage of 86.78%
(Citeseer), 81.06% (Cora) and 14.56% (Pubmed). The same train-
test-validation distribution is used for the three datasets with 30%
train records and 60% test records and remaining 10% as validation
records.
5.5 Attribute Inference Attack
In case of attribute inference attacks, we evaluate two state of
the art embedding models: Node2Vec and DeepWalk, using three
attack models: Neural Networks (NN), Random Forest (RF) and
Support Vector Machine (SVM). We generate embeddings using
the two algorithms on Facebook and LastFM dataset which contain
gender and location as sensitive attributes, respectively. That is,
the adversary infers user gender as a target sensitive attribute in
Facebook dataset classified into one of three classes: Male, Female
and Others. The location target attribute for LastFM dataset is
categorized in 18 locations for the users in the network.
The inference attack performance is given by the F1 score (Fig-
ure 10). For Facebook, the graph embedding using DeepWalk re-
sulted in an F1 score of 0.57 for NN, 0.58 for RF and 0.59 for SVM
classifier. On the other hand, Facebook’s Node2Vec embedding
showed an F1 score of 0.59, 0.57 and 0.61 respectively for NN, Rf
and SVM attack classifier. In case of LastFM, we found the attack F1
scores for Node2Vec for higher than DeepWalk embeddings. The
F1 score for DeepWalk 0.61, 0.62 and 0.65 corresponding to NN,
RF and SVM attack classifier while the F1 score using Node2Vec
embeddings are 0.80, 0.83 and 0.83 for NN, RF and SVM.
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Figure 10: F1 score for different attack classifiers to infer sen-
sitive attributes.
Impact of Adversary’s Knowledge. The performance of the
attack model for Facebook dataset did not increase by much. On
increasing the knowledge of the adversary’s auxiliary dataset from
30% to 50%, the confidence of attack on LastFM dataset increases.
For DeepWalk algorithm, the attack F1 score increases to 0.69 from
0.61 for NN, 0.71 from 0.62 for RF and 0.69 from 0.65 for SVM attack
classifier. On the other hand, for Node2Vec, the attack model F1
score increased to 0.83 from 0.80 for NN, 0.84 from 0.83 for RF and
0.86 from 0.83 for SVM.
6 RELATEDWORK
Inference attacks that violate data privacy have been explored in
the context of traditional machine learning models. Membership
Inference attacks can be deployed in both whitebox [27] and black-
box [31] setting in traditional machine learning algorithms. These
attacks are further extended to collaborative learning [24, 27] and
generative models [16]. On the other hand, reconstruction attacks
infer private attributes of the inputs passed to the models [2, 10–
12]. Other privacy attacks aim to extract hyperparameters [38],
reverse engineer the model architecture and parameters using side
channels [9] or the output predictions [8]. Memorization of data by
Neural Networks has been attributed as a major cause for privacy
leakage [5, 33, 34]. Further, recent works have indicated privacy
risks in Graph NNs where an adversary can infer the presence of a
link between two nodes using a manual threshold between the dis-
tance of two node features [17]. This attack however, is subsumed
within our more generic attack methodology where we extract the
entire adjacency matrix which can be used to infer the presence
of links. Text models have been shown to leak user data through
attribute inference and inversion attacks [28, 32]. However, a direct
application of these attacks is not possible in case of high dimen-
sional graphs and requires additional consideration to the network
structure making our problem challenging. Other than privacy at-
tacks, adversarial attacks against GNNs [3, 43] have been explored
as well as training algorithms to enhance the robustness against
such attacks [42, 44].
TomitigateMembership attacks,Memguard [19] andAttriGuard [18]
add carefully crafted noise to the final output prediction to misclas-
sify the shadow model attacks. Adversarial regularization using
minimax optimization regularizes the model to mitigate inference
attacks [26]. Regularization through ensemble training, dropout and
L2-regularization have been studied [30]. Differential Privacy miti-
gates such privacy attacks with theoretical guarantees by adding
noise to gradients but faces an unbalanced privacy accuracy trade-
off [1]. Such Differential Privacy frameworks have also been ex-
plored in the context of graph and text embeddings [39, 40] but
their efficacy on lowering privacy risks from the proposed attacks
is yet to be explored.
7 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This work provides the first comprehensive privacy risk analy-
sis related to graph embedding algorithms trained on sensitive
graph data. Specifically, this paper quantifies privacy leakage of
three major classes of privacy attacks under practical adversary as-
sumptions and threat models, namely membership inference, graph
reconstruction and attribute inference. Firstly, an adversary con-
ducting a membership inference attack aims to infer whether a
given user’s node was used in the training graph dataset or not.
Secondly, publicly released embeddings can be inverted to obtain
the input graph data enabling an adversary to perform graph recon-
struction attack on the sensitive graph data. This further enables
the adversary to perform link inference attack to infer whether a
link exists between two nodes in the network. Finally, we show
that an adversary can infer sensitive hidden attributes of users such
as gender and location from the graph embeddings. Our results
underlines many privacy risks in graph embeddings and calls for
further research to mitigate these privacy threats.
Potential mitigation strategies to lower the privacy risks can be
considered. For instance, lowering the precision of the embedding
vector for each node by rounding can help to reduce the attack
model from learning rich features about the inputs [28, 31]. In
the proposed attacks, the attacker model is a machine learning
algorithm vulnerable to adversarial examples, i.e, imperceptible
noise added to the output prediction to force the target model to
misclassify. The embeddings can be released with an additional
adversarial noise to misclassify the target model while additionally
ensuring utility [18, 19]. Further, the inference attacks can be mod-
elled within the training process as a minimax adversarial training
with joint optimization to minimize the model loss using the graph
embeddings (e.g., GNNs) while maximising the adversary’s loss
on inferring the sensitive inputs [26, 32]. Finally, Differential Pri-
vacy can provide a theoretical bound on the total privacy leakage
from the downstream processing from embeddings on an individ-
ual’s data point [39, 40]. However, the efficacy of these potential
mitigations are left for future work.
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